

Who Am I?

"Name: Jim Hardin "

"Arrived RVN: Feb 1967"

"Transferred from 2/22nd RVN: May 1967"

"Company: C"



Jim Hardin

I joined Co B, 2/12 INF just shortly before departing Fort Lewis. I came over with the 3rd BDE on the USNS Nelson Walker in September of 1966.

C/2/22 took heavy casualties during the Cease Fire Period of Tet of 1967. As a result I asked to be transferred to the 22nd, arriving in February, 1967.

After 2 nights in base camp completing paperwork & equipment issue, I was flown out to the field with evening chow.

I met CPT George White III (deceased 1/12), and took out an ambush patrol that night.

Shortly after Soui Tri, I was transferred under the DEROS Program, which was to break up the 3rd BDE so that all 3,000 would not all leave on the same day at the same place.

I served with some great people and have many happy memories.

Jim also contributed several maps and articles about Dau Tieng and Suoi Tre. Continue scrolling to see them:



"Camp Rainier"

Dau Tieng, South Vietnam 1967-1968

Home of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, The Funky Fourth, until August 1, 1967 when it was redesignated as the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, The Electric Strawberry.


POINTS OF INTEREST

- A Southwest Main Gate
- B Gate for the indigenous Vietnamese workers from Dau Tieng
- C Southeast Main Gate
- D North Main Gate
- ✓ Viet Cong tunnels being dug into the base camp. These tunnels were used later in the conflict to gain access to the interior of the camp.
- 1. 3rd Brigade Headquarters (HQ) and Tactical Operations Center (TOC)
- 2. Michelin Villa with swimming pool (used by French managers when they flew up from Saigon)
- 3. Officers swimming pool
- 4. 2/12 "White Warriors" HQ and TOC
- 5. Main swimming pool and snack bar
- 6. 3rd Brigade Hospital, D Company 25th Medical Battalion
- 7. 188th Assault Helicopter Company "Black Widows" HQ and TOC
- 8. 188th Motor Pool
- 9. 188th helicopter revetment area also known as "THE WEB"- JP4, Pol and ammo rearm point
- 10. 188th, 603d and 4th Signal Detachment maintenance area
- 11. 25th Aviation hanger, OH21 and OH23
- 12. PX and Chapel
- 13. 3/22 "Regulars" HQ and TOC
- 14. 1/27 Artillery HQ and TOC (155mm Howitzer), 44th Scout Dog Platoon
- 15. 2/22 "Triple Deuce" HQ and TOC
- 16. Air traffic control-tower, counter mortar standby and the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (OV-10) "Bronco's"
- 17. Main Runway 26, C-130, C-123 and C7A fixed wing only

- 18. 25th Supply and Transport
- 19. 2/77 Artillery HQ and TOC, 155mm Howitzer, direct support
- 20. Division artillery, 175mm and 8" Howitzer
- 21. C Battery 1/27 Field Artillery, 155mm Howitzer
- 22. 3rd Platoon, 25th MP Company
- 23. Laterite pit and dump - the Vietnamese would fight over the garbage we dumped, pimps would sell happy smoke and whores, plus a favorite spot for V.C. snipers.
- 24. Small arms familiarization area
- 25. AP Non village, check point (off limits)
- 26. Dau Tieng village, located on the Saigon River, was off limits and controlled at night by the Viet Cong.
- 27. Michelin Latex factory for processing of rubber
- 28. Michelin Rubber Plantation, 32 Hamlets
- 29. Main Road around the base camp, during daylight hours you could buy happy smoke and whores all along this road.
- 30. 603d Transportation Detachment, 154th Medical Detachment and 4th Signal Detachment

LOCATION UNKNOWN

C Company 588th Engineers
 Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA and E) - Korean civilians hired to maintain power and lights for the entire base camp.
 Troop C 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry
 725th Maintenance
 5/2 Artillery, 40mm Duster's and Quad 50's
 7/11 Artillery, "On Time", 105mm Howitzer
 Delta Company, 65th Engineers
 587th Signal Battalion: Mars Station



LETTERS

Mech Commander Adds Detail About Suoi Tre Account

Dear Sir:

I enjoyed the article on "The Battle of Suoi Tre," written by First Sergeant Christopher P. Worick in your May-June 2000 issue of *ARMOR*. I know it is difficult to gather first-hand detailed information on an action after 30+ years. The author has done a fine job, all things considered. There are a few items I would like to furnish that might be of importance from my first-hand point of view as commander of the 2/22 Inf (Mech) during this operation.

The 2/22 Inf (Mech) joined up with the 2/34 Armor (-) on March 18 to cross the Bach Sohn Doi near its junction with the Soui Mat stream. The Armor battalion had 18 tanks and a tank retriever (M-88), plus their headquarters vehicles. To facilitate operations, we cross-attached elements to establish the task forces as follows:

- 2/22 Inf (M) (-)
 - Co B, 2/22 Inf (M)
 - Co C, 2/22 Inf (M)
 - Co A, 2/34 Armor
- 2/34 Armor (-)
 - Co C, 2/34 Armor
 - Co A, 2/22 Inf (M)

with further internal cross attachments.

The crossing site was just north of a fire support base at Xa Loc Ninh occupied by B Btry, 2/35th Arty (155 SP) and B Btry, 2/32 Arty (8 in. and 175 mm) that provided support for our operation and FSB Gold. After crossing the rivers, both task forces moved north on the west side of Soui Mat stream in column to ease passage through the dense trees with the 2/22 TF leading. We were looking for another crossing site to get on the east side of the Soui Mat as it generally ran to the northwest, away from FSB Gold. The lower end was very boggy and the AVLBs could not span this area after their initial employment. At the end of March 18, we had moved about 2,000 meters north, paralleling the Soui Mat without finding a suitable crossing site. The AVLBs used to cross the river and the lower part of Soui Mat were returned to their base as their size would pose many problems going through the heavy undergrowth in the jungle and there were no identifiable sites for their immediate use.

On March 19, we continued moving north parallel to the Soui Mat and again moved about 2,000 meters conducting operations in zone and seeking a crossing site to the east without success.

March 20th saw a continuation of the move north, approximately 2,000 meters, with some skirmishes, but no success with a crossing site. The recon platoon of the 2/22 Inf (M), which had been in the lead at this time, had stopped about 1,000 meters north

of our night laager and returned without finding a crossing on the Soui Mat. (Little did we know, but at that point the Soui Mat was a dry bed with firm, fairly level ground that could not be seen from the air and not readily identified on the ground due to the dense growth.) It was planned that after stand-to the next morning, to go east from where the recon element stopped the previous night and look for another crossing site. As the jungle was so dense we could not see the meandering of the stream nor any place to cross by following its path from the air.

When the attack on FSB Gold started on the morning of March 21, I established the order of march from the laager with TF 2/22 elements leading. They were to establish a trail from the recon platoon's northern penetration and go due east towards FSB Gold. In my command helicopter, I was able to orbit the lead vehicle and direct its travel through the least dense areas and shortest line (it was approximately 2,500 meters) to FSB Gold. All vehicles traveled in column, with the M113s widening the trail to facilitate the tanks' movement through the trees. At the same time we were moving east, the 2/12 Inf was recalled from an area northwest of FSB Gold where it had gone on an operation on March 20. On entering the clearing in the southwest corner of FSB Gold, the combined elements of 2/22 Inf (M) and 2/34 Armor TF moved in column in a counterclockwise direction around the base to secure the SW, SE & NE sectors with the 2/12 Inf the NW sector. Once the perimeter was closed and secured, close-in operations continued, to include the retrieval of the FAC team from the airplane, about 1,000 meters south of FSB Gold, by the 2/22 Inf (M) recon platoon.

Many people have written about this operation, and there have been many variations to sort out. I hope that my comments above will aid in visualizing the operation from my viewpoint. There were many problems using tanks in the heavy jungle, as stated by 1LT Danny Hollister in the article. It was bad enough for the M113s, but the terrain dictated where you could and could not go with heavy armored vehicles vs. the M113s.

COL RALPH W. JULIAN (Ret.)
Highlands Ranch, Colo.

More Detail Added By Another Suoi Tre Leader

Dear Sir:

As an author of an advanced course monograph on the battle of Suoi Tre and a platoon leader in A Company, 2-34 Armor (my platoon was OPCON to 2-22 INF) during the fight, I want to say that First Sergeant Christopher P. Worick has done a superb job on his account of the battle. I would add that the commander of the 2nd Bn, 77th Arty was LTC John W. Vessey, who distinguished himself in the four-hour battle.

In 1970, on my second tour, I flew over Suoi Tre. The rectangle where we buried the 647 Viet Cong could be clearly seen at 1,000 feet. The weather was clear with no clouds in the sky, unlike that day in March.

COLONEL A. J. FERREA
U.S. Army, Retired
via email

Clarifying British and Canadian Use Of Converted Armor as APCs

Dear Sir:

I just got the July-August *ARMOR*, a good issue with a wide range of articles. Something to please everyone, if that is ever possible.

One small point caught my eye. In CPT Leaf's article on "MOUT and the 1982 Lebanon Campaign," his note 14, describing the use of armored self-propelled gun carriers for troop transport in British service in Normandy, ends with the sentence, "The idea did not take hold, due mainly to a lack of desire by the artillery to ferry troops around." This may seem strange to some readers, and I hope the following will clear the matter up.

The vehicles used were at one time SP guns, in fact the U.S. M7 105mm HMC, known as "Priests" in British service. These were based on the M3-series medium tank, with the fighting compartment replaced with an open-topped, protected box with the standard M2A1 105mm howitzer mounted to fire with limited traverse through the front plate. First used at El Alamein in 1942, they equipped several British and Canadian artillery units in the assault waves on D Day, firing from landing craft during the landing approaches and then employed as mobile artillery. As the 105mm was not a standard caliber in Commonwealth service, their standard towed and SP field gun being the 25pdr, the vehicles were soon taken out of service. For use as troop carriers, Canadian mechanics removed the guns and plated over the aperture as a quick-fix measure, the conversion being designed to be reversible. Used during the Normandy bridgehead Operation TOTALISE, these vehicles, dubbed "Unfrocksed Priests" but commonly known as "Kangaroos," were thought to have been sufficiently successful to lead to more permanent employment.

What resulted was another Canadian effort, but more so. The carrier vehicle used was the Canadian Ram, a medium tank — a "Cruiser" in Commonwealth parlance — with the turret removed. The Ram was also derived from the U.S. M3 series, but unlike that vehicle's trademark side-mounted 75mm main gun and small gun in the turret, the Ram was in many ways like the M4 Sherman in that it was a conventional design. Regarded in mid-1944 as obsolescent as a gun tank due to its small, 57mm 6pdr gun, and superseded in Canadian armored units by

VC Onslaught at **FIRE**

Like the cavalry in the Old West, an armored task force arrived just in the nick of time to relieve the besieged defenders of FSB Gold.

By Lt. Col. Robert L. Hemphill,
U.S. Army (ret.)

Time: 0631 hours, March 21, 1967. The sound of small-arms fire, answered by the distinct sound of AK-47 fire and the "crump" of grenades, suddenly jolted Captain James ("Walt") Shugart III, commander of Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, out of his reverie. He stuck his head out of his command post bunker at Fire Support Base Gold to see what the firing was about.


Specialist 4 Terry Smith, his radio operator (RTO) on the company communications network, was outside the bunker. He told Shugart that the firing was coming from the direction of the 1st Platoon's ambush patrol site, which was about 500 meters outside the perimeter. As the firing continued, Shugart called the 1st Platoon leader (call sign "Bravo 1-6"), 2nd Lt. John H. Andrews, Jr., for a situation report.

Andrews informed the Bravo Company commander that his patrol was engaged in a serious firefight. While breaking down their ambush site, the men had spotted a couple of VC. When they opened up on the enemy and threw their grenades, the VC had returned their fire—they had been in the tall grass around them.

When Shugart inquired about casualties, Andrews knew only that part of the patrol had made it back in to get help, but that there were still about five guys pinned down out there. Shugart told him to get a squad ready to provide help, but he withdrew that order a few minutes later when the firing died down and he heard several bursts of AK-47 fire. He knew the short, distinct bursts meant that any survivors had been executed.

Shugart looked around for 1st Lt. William Pacheco, his artillery forward observer (FO),

VC troops assault FSB Gold on March 21, 1967, in Battle of Suoi Tre, by Jim D. Nelson. Nelson, then a member of Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (2/22), later served as the combat artist for the headquarters of the 25th Infantry Division (Mechanized).



and ordered him to call in some high explosives (HE) around the ambush patrol's last position. He wanted it near the position, not on it, in case somebody was still alive out there. Shugart told Pacheco to walk the HE around the area in case any larger forces were nearby. But the fire mission was never executed—before the target could be plotted, everyone in the perimeter heard the sound of enemy mortar rounds going down the tubes beyond the ambush position.

Shugart shouted a warning that echoed throughout the firebase. Men could be seen diving for the nearest bunker as 61mm and 82mm mortar rounds started falling everywhere, walking all around the perimeter and the artillery tubes.

So began what later became known as the Battle of Suoi Tre, or the Defense of FSB (or LZ) Gold. The location was a small clearing in a remote section of jungle near Cambodia in War Zone C, III Corps Tactical Zone. The 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (brigade call sign "Flexible"), commanded by

Colonel Marshall B. Garth, was operating in the area. On the perimeter at FSB Gold were Alpha and Bravo companies, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (3/22, call sign "Falcon"), commanded by Lt. Col. John A. Bender, with the 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery (2/77), 105mm (call sign "Focus"), and its three howitzer batteries inside the firebase. The artillery battalion commander, Lt. Col. John W. Vessey, would later become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Operating in the nearby jungle were the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry (2/12, call sign "Flame"), and tank-mechanized infantry task forces of the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (2/22 Mechanized, call sign "Fullback"), and the attached 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor (2/34). Supporting FSB Gold from other locations were other units of 8-inch, 175mm



and additional 105mm and 155mm howitzers.

At 0635 the opening mortar attack drifted toward Alpha Company's side of the perimeter. Suddenly, from the 2nd Platoon's area in Bravo's center to the east, the perimeter was raked by intense fire. The small-arms fire, punctuated by exploding grenades and claymores, gradually crescendoed.

RTO Smith informed Shugart that "Romeo 6" (the recon platoon leader) had reported a large number of VC to his front. They had sneaked up to within 30 or 40 meters of his positions, and he was heavily engaged.


The recon platoon had been given to Shugart the day before, to reconstitute his 2nd Platoon after the platoon leader and half of its members had been wounded on the 19th at the LZ. He told Romeo 6 to send in his final protective fire when he thought it was necessary, to which Romeo 6 responded that it was already necessary. Shugart looked around for Lieutenant Pacheco and saw that he was already on his radio, calling in his defensive contact artillery fire. The FO glanced up and reported that it was on its way.

As Shugart was about to warn the other platoons, Bravo's entire sector erupted in gunfire. The biggest outbreak of outgoing and incoming fire was on the right (southeast), in Bravo 1-6's area. Andrews reported massive waves of black-clad enemy to his front at a distance of less than 50 meters. He said they were just boiling out of the wood line. Shugart ordered Andrews to provide final protective fire.

The 3rd Platoon leader on the left (northeast), 2nd Lt. James Slinkard (call sign "Bravo 3-6"), reported that enemy troops were massed to the front but he was holding his own. He was also instructed to provide his final protective fire.

Mortars continued to fall inside the perimeter among the artillery tubes and near Alpha Company. The defenders could hear the shells crashing near the perimeter and the more distant explosions of counter-mortar fire. The volume of mortar fire was diminishing. It was now 0638. Only seven minutes had passed since the ambush patrol had set off the VC attack.

The VC had been sneaking up on them in the woods and tall grass when the patrol had surprised the enemy troops. Shugart turned to Spc. 4 Henry Toyama, his RTO on the battalion radio, and told him to inform the battalion S-3 (operations officer), Major Cliff Roberts, that they were fully engaged and providing final protective fire. He also instructed Toyama to ask Falcon 3, Colonel Bender, where the Air Force's tactical air support was—it was clearly needed.



Above: While FSB Gold's defenders fought for survival north of the Suoi Samat River in March 1967, elements of Task Force Fullback—comprised of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry; the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry; and the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor—moved to assist them. **Top:** The emblem of the 22nd Infantry Regiment.



American infantrymen take cover behind a termite hill as they come under fire from elusive VC snipers near the Cambodian border on March 22, 1967.

1,000-foot altitude down into the trees. Shugart asked Pacheco what had happened. Pacheco looked up from his map, shocked, and said that the VC had shot him down. That meant there would be a lull in the airstrikes.

As the ramifications of the loss of air support sank in, Shugart directed Pacheco to tell the artillery fire direction center that he wanted beehive rounds loaded and standing by—now! Beehives were anti-personnel rounds that contained thousands of small flechettes capable of converting a human being—or a group of them—into hamburger in the blink of an eye. They had not been used much before, but the commanders had been briefed on them.

Shugart called Bravo 1-6 and asked for a report. Andrews reported that they had just linked up with the reaction force. The VC kept on coming, despite their losses.

Shugart decided to use the beehives in 1-6's sector. He told Andrews to get his men under cover, then gave the order to Pacheco to fire toward the east and southeast. One minute later the first shell screamed overhead and exploded over 1-6's sector, followed by several more. The company radio crackled to life, and Andrews' excited voice attested to the effectiveness of the beehive rounds. The flechettes had torn a wide swath in the attacking ranks of VC—he wanted more.

On the battalion radio, Shugart called "Alpha 6," Captain George Shoemaker. He quickly summarized his situation, particularly in Bravo 3-6's sector, and requested that

Alpha have a reaction force standing by, expecting to need it for 3-6. Shoemaker agreed.

Shugart told Toyama to report what was going on to Falcon 3. He also wanted to know when they were getting another FAC.

The company radio jumped to life at 0800. It was Slinkard, reporting that his sector had been penetrated. The VC had occupied a couple of foxholes in his center. His reserve squad was trying to block them, but he needed help. Reassuring 3-6 that help was on its way, Shugart notified Alpha 6 to dispatch his reaction force. Shoemaker replied that his 20-man force would be moving in two minutes.

At 0810 Slinkard called Bravo 6 to say that Alpha's force had linked up with him

and that they were containing the penetration but the fighting was fierce. Shugart told his FO to get some beehives into 3-6's area. Three minutes later, rounds began screaming in that direction.

At 0820 Shugart received reports from all platoons that they were barely holding their own and that ammo was running low. Clearly, they were firing a lot of ammunition, since they had started the battle with a double basic load. The VC were continuing to press Shugart's perimeter as more troops flowed from the woods.

The platoons had prepared secondary positions back around the artillery tubes the day before. In addition to rehearsing an artillery counterattack, Shugart had made the platoon leaders rehearse the movement back to those positions. Now was the time to use them. He gave each platoon leader instructions for moving back to their secondary positions: They would have to fight their way back, holding off the attackers as their squads leapfrogged backward. He test-fired the artillery while they were moving.

By 0840, all Bravo platoons had completed their move to the secondary positions and obtained ammo from the artillery. In their new positions, they were closer together, making their formation harder to penetrate. Furthermore, the artillery could now fire their beehives over the soldiers' heads, directly into the attacking VC, making it much more effective.

However, the swarm of VC kept coming at them like an army of ants after a jar of honey. Although the enemy troops did not penetrate the dense rain of small-arms and automatic fire and beehives, they were within hand-grenade range of the battalion command post and within five meters of the aid station. But the tenacious defense managed to blunt the waves of attackers before they could get to most of the artillery.

At 0845 a silver bird again swooped down and laid its 500-pound high-explosive egg. Another FAC was on station.

Shouting so that he could be heard above the din of battle, Shugart told Pacheco to

9TH VC DIVISION


After the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, arrived in Vietnam in 1966 as a part of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, the battalion frequently fought one of the enemy's most aggressive formations, the 9th VC Division. A Main Force unit, the 9th Division was composed of three regiments: the 271st, 272nd and 273rd. On occasion, the 101st NVA Regiment

operated with the 9th Division. All battalions of the 3rd Brigade (redesignated as the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, in August 1967) repeatedly encountered units of the 9th VC Division until it was virtually destroyed during the countrywide 1968 Tet Offensive.

Between major engagements with the 9th Division's regiment-sized forces,

the 3/22 Infantry fought numerous small-unit skirmishes in the jungle with squad-sized detachments of those four regiments. The skirmishes were characterized by their intensity and short duration.

The VC would stand and fight with whatever they had, but when the Americans gained the upper hand, the enemy would disappear into the jungle. Few were caught, and few bodies were found. Frequently, our soldiers dis-



As the Army tries to drive VC forces from the Cambodian border, American infantrymen rush to take cover from artillery fire during Operation Junction City on March 29. The VC had been pounding their LZ three minutes before the first helicopters arrived.

have the FAC put HE in the wood line and napalm within 50 meters of his current position on the east. Pacheco had to make sure that the FAC knew they had pulled in. After relaying Shugart's instructions, Pacheco informed Bravo 6 that 2/77 had run out of beehives. The guns would be using direct-fire HE at point-blank range.

By 0900, Bravo was running short of ammo again, but their reduced perimeter was still intact. Alpha was under moderate pressure from VC 15 meters from their positions, but they still held their original perimeter.

Staff Sergeant Robert F. Freeman, the second squad leader in 2/22 Charlie's 2nd Platoon, halted his armored personnel carrier 30 meters inside the wood line south-

west of FSB Gold. He checked to make sure the other tracks were ready. His track commander, above him, pulled back the cocking handle twice to ready his .50-caliber machine gun for firing. Freeman's job was to lead the company in the charge against the VC trying to overrun Gold. He checked to see that his squad members had their weapons ready.

Earlier that morning, as they were preparing to break camp just south of the Suoi Samat River, the members of the platoon had heard the mortar and automatic-weapons fire erupt around FSB Gold, about 400 meters to their front. Every man in the company knew that they were in a position to assist the defenders.

Task Force Fullback was comprised of most of the 2/22 Mechanized with Company A, 2/34 Armor, attached. Although Charlie Company—with one tank platoon—was only 400 meters from FSB Gold, the rest of Fullback was 3,000 meters to the southwest. They had spent most of the previous day trying to cross the Prek Klock River, just managing to get all units across before nightfall. They had established their night position near the river. Charlie Company, commanded by Captain George C. White III, had crossed first and had been sent ahead of the task force.

The recon platoon, commanded by 1st Lt. Roger Frydrykowski, was positioned with the task force headquarters until the firing started at FSB Gold. The platoon then moved forward to Charlie Company's location.

When White heard the firing at Gold, he requested permission from Lt. Col. Ralph W. Julian (call sign "Fullback 6") to react to Falcon. Julian, who wanted to consolidate his combat power, denied his request. But the brigade commander, Colonel Garth, wanted the 2/22 to move more quickly through the jungle and bamboo to get some combat force up to the firebase. Garth prodded Julian until he finally gave in.

From his observation helicopter, Julian told White (call sign "Charlie 6") to go in with all he had. Since the task force was only about 500 meters from Charlie's location, they could assist if necessary. White issued his instructions to his platoon leaders and Romeo 6. He told the 2nd Platoon leader, 2nd Lt. Thomas Utter, to have Free-

covered and followed blood trails, which most likely would peter out or lead the Americans into another brief clash with the fleeing enemy.

The battalion engaged regiments of the 9th Division in two major battles. On March 12, 1967, during Operation Junction City II, the battalion fought the Battle of Suoi Tre at FSB Gold. The defenders killed at least 647 soldiers of the 9th Division, the highest single-battle body count of

the war. On January 1, 1968, the battalion withstood the brunt of the attack by two regiments of the 9th Division on FSB Burt, a battle sometimes known as Suoi Cut. The Burt defenders, including a mechanized battalion and four artillery batteries, accounted for 500 dead VC by body count, also one of the largest of the war for a single battle.

During the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 9th Division was decimated by the Al-

lied counteroffensive and ceased to be an effective indigenous fighting force. The name was retained, but the unit was manned mostly by NVA regulars. It was at one time located near Loc Ninh, but in December 1972—after U.S. combat units were withdrawn—the 9th was redesignated the 9th NVA Division, consisting of the 271st, 272nd and 95-C NVA regiments; the 273rd ceased to exist in South Vietnam. R.L.H.



Soldiers of the 4th Division rush a wounded GI to an evacuation helicopter near the Cambodian border during Operation Junction City in the spring of 1967.

man lead the attack, since Utter had not seen much action.

White told Freeman to cross the shallow river and have the FAC guide him into position. Beyond the river, Freeman executed a flanking movement to the west to avoid some big trees and to allow the company to get on line. While this was being done, the recon platoon crossed the river to the west and surged ahead of Charlie, heading back east and then north, and the tankers followed.

As Freeman prepared to launch the assault, he looked to the east and saw the 2/12's infantrymen bursting into the southern end of the clearing, firing as soon as they cleared the trees. They had fought their way through the sniper fire in good time. Freeman waved the company on.

At 0901 Shugart heard firing off his right flank, to the south. He could see infantrymen emerge from the wood line, heading for the perimeter with weapons blazing into the flank of the attacking VC. He told Toyama to inform Falcon 3 that the 2/12 was approaching the perimeter from the south. He then ordered Pacheco to shift the artillery away from that area to avoid hitting the good guys. Toyama relayed a message from Falcon 3 that Alpha Company was the 2/12's lead element, and that Bravo 6 was to guide him into position. Shugart contacted Alpha 6, Shoemaker, and then began planning how to use the 2/12 to restore his perimeter.

Suddenly from the southeast corner of the clearing came the roar of engines and the crash of heavy-caliber machine guns. Through the battlefield haze, Shugart saw a line of tracks emerge from the wood line, pass through the 2/12's lines and head directly for the southern end of Alpha's sector.

A few moments later, he saw more tracks charge out of the woods from the south, followed by several tanks. They passed around the perimeter and charged into the flank of the attackers between the perimeter and the wood line.

Shugart watched 2/22 Charlie Company's tracks sweep across the clearing, through Alpha Company's southern perimeter, through the southern half of his sector and back out to the east, the .50 calibers cutting wide swaths in the VC ranks. Charlie's tracks crashed into the attackers head-on, track treads grinding bodies as the vehicles rolled over everything ahead of them. Soldiers used pioneer tools to knock off VC who attacked tracks with their bayonets and tried to swarm over the turrets. Passing through the original perimeter, Charlie turned north to cover the VC's exit route.

Recon and the tanks swept to the east outside the perimeter and north along the wood line, cutting deeply into the enemy ranks. As they continued to chew up the attacking formations, the VC began to turn and run toward the woods, dragging many of their casualties with them. The tanks roared forward, trying to cut them off before they reached the trees.

When Alpha 6 of 2/12 arrived, Shugart briefed him on his plans for the counter-attack. He then told his platoon leaders to move out on his order.

At 0920, after 2/22 moved beyond the perimeter, Shugart gave the order to move out. A line of men from each platoon sector stood up simultaneously, firing point-blank into the VC still moving around them inside the perimeter. Moving forward, they took out anything in their way, firing, changing magazines and then closing in on the few enemy troops that survived the furious on-

slaught. Moving with precision, they arrived at their old positions, pulled out the dead and wounded, jumped into the foxholes and began firing from their old positions. Medics evacuated any friendly wounded uncovered by the counterattack.

At 0928 Shugart had Toyama inform Falcon 3 that they had reoccupied their old positions. Toyama then relayed a return message from Major Roberts that Charlie Company, 2/22, had found a VC aid station just north of the perimeter. They also came across Bravo's ambush platoon position, where they found four KIAs and one man alive—Pfc Edward Watson. He had hidden under some bodies until help appeared.

Across the battlefield, the VC attack faltered. They ran from the firebase, back into the woods to the northeast. The mechanized and armored formations chased the VC into the wood line, trying to get as many of them as possible. The supporting artillery had been shifted into the woods to pound their avenue of withdrawal.

As Charlie, recon and the tanks entered the wood line after the VC, the remainder of Task Force Fullback reached the clearing, taking up positions outside the perimeter. Later they were joined by the 2/34 Armor.

After the firing died down inside the perimeter, Colonel Vessey, the artillery battalion commander, toured the units on the perimeter, congratulating them on the tremendous job they had done. As Vessey was talking to Bravo 6, Flexible 6's command chopper landed, and he turned it over to Vessey to evacuate the casualties. Soon medevac choppers appeared as well.

Later that evening, Major Roberts called a meeting, and the commanders learned the extent of their victory. They were told that the battle would be called "Suoi Tre" after a village that had once been nearby.

Bravo Company had taken the brunt of the attack, which had been conducted by the VC 272nd Main Force Regiment, reinforced by two battalions, for a total of six battalions consisting of about 2,500 men. The attackers had lost 647 men. As many as 200 more were believed to have been killed and dragged away after the battle.

Friendly casualties included 31 KIAs and 187 wounded. Supporting artillery had fired more than 3,900 rounds of various sizes, with the 2/77 alone firing more than 2,200 rounds of HE and 40 rounds of beehives, most of it fired point-blank. The Air Force had flown 31 sorties around the perimeter, dropping 34 tons of ordnance. Participating 3rd Brigade units later received the Presidential Unit Citation. ☆

Then Captain Robert L. Hemphill commanded Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, in 1967-68. Suggestions for further reading: *Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning*, by Eric M. Bergerud (Westview); and *Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division: Tropic Lightning*, edited by Lt. Col. Duquesne Wolf (Tamer Publishing).



2-22-p01.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p02.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p03.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p04.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p05.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p06.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p07.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p08.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p09.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p10.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p11.jpg | A "Duster", twin 40MM Cannon, track mounted, capable of 240 Rounds/minute peak firepower. These guys occasionally traveled with Triple Deuce. (640x480)



2-22-p12.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p13.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p14.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p15.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p16.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p17.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p18.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p19.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p20.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p21.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p22.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p23.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p24.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p25.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p26.jpg (640x480)



2-22-p27.jpg (640x480)




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2-22-p29.jpg (640x480)








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
















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NOTES

1. The type of preferred Patton for service in Vietnam was the M48A3, because it was fitted with a diesel engine, giving a better performance and greater crew safety in case of a 'brew-up'. Weighing over 50 tons, yet capable of speeds up to 30 m.p.h. and reasonable going, it mounted a 90-mm main gun as its main armament. The M48A1 and M48A2, both of which had petrol engines, also saw service in Vietnam. There were also variations including an Armoured Vehicle

2. As quoted in *Armoured Combat in Vietnam* by Gen Donn A. Starry.
3. Known as "Beehive" ammunition, these contained thousands of steel arrow heads (flechettes) which were far more lethal than the normal ball-bearing type of canister round filling.
4. Starry, *Armoured Combat in Vietnam*.

Then.jpg (640x480)

Top: Thrives of the U.S. chemical industry, backed from 1945 to 1960 by powerful military and atomic energy support, was strong enough to overcome the opposition of the U.S. labor movement. Bottom: The U.S. chemical industry today is still a dominant player in the global market.

“Sublime Speech,” heard Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, was the name given to the U.S. government’s propaganda campaign to convince Americans that the U.S. chemical industry was the best hope for the world’s future. The campaign was based on the idea that the U.S. chemical industry was the only one in the world that was not only producing the goods that the world needed, but also the goods that the world wanted. The campaign was based on the idea that the U.S. chemical industry was the only one in the world that was not only producing the goods that the world needed, but also the goods that the world wanted.

Shingler, lead spokesman for the PACO in the U.S., said that the PACO was the only one in the world that was not only producing the goods that the world needed, but also the goods that the world wanted. Shingler said that the PACO was the only one in the world that was not only producing the goods that the world needed, but also the goods that the world wanted.

On October 16, the plant located there at the time was the only one in the world that was not only producing the goods that the world needed, but also the goods that the world wanted. On October 16, the plant located there at the time was the only one in the world that was not only producing the goods that the world needed, but also the goods that the world wanted.

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Alpha has a reputation for its pioneering in the use of the computer in the classroom. The school's computer lab is the largest in the state, and the school has a reputation for its use of the computer in the classroom. The school has a reputation for its use of the computer in the classroom.

The first American influenza pandemic in 1918 was first reported here, spreading to the rest of the world. The first American influenza pandemic in 1918 was first reported here, spreading to the rest of the world.

ment of PBS and it behooved to acknowledge that. Our readers may be surprised to learn that, like all public-broadcasting stations, PBS is a not-for-profit organization. The fact that PBS is a not-for-profit organization gives the Federal Communications Board the right to require that PBS be run in the public interest. The FCC has been very helpful in this regard. It has asked PBS to make certain changes in its programming and to make certain changes in its management. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its financial structure. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its governance. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its operations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its personnel. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its facilities. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its equipment. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its services. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its products. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its distribution. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its marketing. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its sales. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its advertising. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its public relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its community relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its government relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its international relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its environmental relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its labor relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its consumer relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its investor relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its creditor relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its supplier relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its customer relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its partner relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its competitor relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its industry relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its government relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its international relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its environmental relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its labor relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its consumer relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its investor relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its creditor relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its supplier relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its customer relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its partner relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its competitor relations. It has also asked PBS to make certain changes in its industry relations.

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